Intimidating a public servant washington
In striking the liens, the court ruled that the defendant had filed them with malicious intent and for the purpose of influencing the judges to alter the rulings or decisions that they had made in official proceedings in the course of their duties as public servants. Thus, the statute does not violate the First Amendment. FACTSIn January 1995, Stephenson was convicted of two counts of second degree theft. The visiting judge specifically found that Stephenson filed these liens with malicious intent and for the purpose of influencing the judges to alter rulings or decisions they made in official proceedings in the course of their duties as public servants. 393, 397, 945 P.2d 1132, review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1005 (1997); Thornhill v.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Kitsap County, No. Williams, J., entered a judgment of guilty on September 29, 1995. Kitsap County Superior Court Judges Leonard Costello and Leonard Kruse had issued arrest warrants, and Judge Kruse had presided over the arraignment and omnibus hearings preceding trial. The State then charged Stephenson with two counts of intimidating a public servant in violation of RCW 9A.76.180. 794, 950 P.2d 38(3)(b), relying upon the definition of threat in RCW 9A.04.110(25)(j).
City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 127, 937 P.2d 154, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997). The plain language of RCW 9A.76.180 suggests several purposes. To take wrongful action as an official against anyone or anything, or wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or9. First, it protects a more significant governmental interest than the coercion ordinance in Ivan.
To testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or8. 794, 950 P.2d 38The statute at issue here is distinguishable for several reasons.
Although it is possible to conceive of circumstances in which application of the statute would be unreasonable, that alone will not render it unconstitutional.
Stephenson asserts that the statute sweeps too broadly and could encompass even a threat to file and run against a public official to coerce a decision to the threatener's liking.
A criminal statute that sweeps within its prohibition a real and substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech will not be invalidated under the overbreadth doctrine if regulation of the protected speech is constitutionally permissible. Criminal Law - Statutes - Overbreadth - Saving Construction - In General. A threat to harm another person's business or financial condition does not constitute a "true threat." Criminal Law - Statutes - Overbreadth - Conduct - Amount of Constitutionally Protected Conduct.
A true threat isa statement "in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates a statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of [another individual]."United States v. The remaining types of3 RCW 9A.04.110 provides:(25) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:(a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or. .(c) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint. Stephenson threatened harm to the judges' financial conditions, not their health or safety. A Substantial Amount of Speech The extent to which a statute "chills or burdens constitutionally protected conduct" turns on whether the statute's prohibition against protected speech or conduct is "real and substantial" compared to its plainly legitimate sweep. 794, 950 P.2d 38threats listed in subsection (j), threats of harm to a person's business, financial condition, or personal relationships, all enjoy some constitutional protection. Huff, 111 Wn.2d at 927.[12, 13] The statute here could apply to communications made in either a public or private forum. See also Huff, 111 Wn.2d at 927 (because telephone harassment ordinance regulates speech of a private nature, nonpublic forum standard applies). Thus, we apply the standards for private speech. The governmental regulation of speech in a non-public forum does not violate the First Amendment if "'the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.'" City of Seattle v. 1990) ("true" threat is one where a reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe she will be subject to physical violence upon her person). Any regulations must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable as to any time, place, or manner restrictions. 794, 950 P.2d 38forums traditionally used by the public for assembly, speech, or debate. The First Amendment generally prohibits government interference in speech or expressive conduct. Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Threat of Jan. Whether a criminal statute impermissibly chills or burdens constitutionally protected speech depends upon whether the statute's prohibition of protected speech is real and substantial in comparison to its plainly legitimate sweep. Criminal Law - Statutes - Overbreadth - Speech - "Threat" - Protected and Unprotected Speech. 950 P.2d 38 Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Private Speech - Government Regulation - Validity - Test. If the answer to those two questions is yes, we must strike the statute as overbroad unless the regulation of protected speech is constitutionally permissible or it is possible to limit the statute's construction so that it does not unconstitutionally interfere with protected speech. Huff, 111 Wn.2d 923, 925, 767 P.2d 572 (1989) (citing Houston v. RCW 9A.04.440(25)(j), which defines a "threat" as a direct or indirect communication of an intent to do any act that is intended to substantially harm another individual's health, safety, business, financial condition, or personal relationships, regulates speech and encompasses both unprotected speech (threats to harm another person's health or safety) and a real and substantial amount of protected speech (threats to harm another person's business, financial condition, or personal relationships). Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Private Speech - Scope of Protection - In General. The government may regulate private speech without violating the first Amendment if the distinctions drawn by the regulation are (1) reasonable in light of the purpose served by the private forum and (2) viewpoint neutral.